Georgia - Russia redux

-- Former Bush administration official Paul Saunders points out "Georgia's Recklessness" in the Washington Post. He notes, in particular, Saakashvili's trampling of democratic principles when it suits him. [via]

-- McCain oversteps, nay, leaps way over the boundary of permissible activity for a presumptive presidential nominee right into conducting foreign policy in lieu of the President of the United States.

-- Mikhail Gorbachev weighs in on the Georgia-Russia conflict and his voice should be heard.

The roots of this tragedy lie in the decision of Georgia's separatist leaders in 1991 to abolish South Ossetian autonomy. Each time successive Georgian leaders tried to impose their will by force - both in South Ossetia and in Abkhazia, where the issues of autonomy are similar - it only made the situation worse.

Nevertheless, it was still possible to find a political solution. Clearly, the only way to solve the South Ossetian problem on that basis is through peaceful means. The Georgian leadership flouted this key principle.

-- Some commonsense analysis by Fred Kaplan at Slate:

Regardless of what happens next, it is worth asking what the Bush people were thinking when they egged on Mikheil Saakashvili, Georgia's young, Western-educated president, to apply for NATO membership, send 2,000 of his troops to Iraq as a full-fledged U.S. ally, and receive tactical training and weapons from our military. Did they really think Putin would sit by and see another border state (and former province of the Russian empire) slip away to the West? If they thought that Putin might not, what did they plan to do about it, and how firmly did they warn Saakashvili not to get too brash or provoke an outburst?

It's heartbreaking, but even more infuriating, to read so many Georgians quoted in the New York Times--officials, soldiers, and citizens--wondering when the United States is coming to their rescue. It's infuriating because it's clear that Bush did everything to encourage them to believe that he would. When Bush (properly) pushed for Kosovo's independence from Serbia, Putin warned that he would do the same for pro-Russian secessionists elsewhere, by which he could only have meant Georgia's separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Putin had taken drastic steps in earlier disputes over those regions--for instance, embargoing all trade with Georgia--with an implicit threat that he could inflict far greater punishment. Yet Bush continued to entice Saakashvili with weapons, training, and talk of entry into NATO. Of course the Georgians believed that if they got into a firefight with Russia, the Americans would bail them out.

Bush pressed the other NATO powers to place Georgia's application for membership on the fast track. The Europeans rejected the idea, understanding the geo-strategic implications of pushing NATO's boundaries right up to Russia's border. If the Europeans had let Bush have his way, we would now be obligated by treaty to send troops in Georgia's defense. That is to say, we would now be in a shooting war with the Russians. Those who might oppose entering such a war would be accused of "weakening our credibility" and "destroying the unity of the Western alliance."

This is where the heartless bastard part of the argument comes in: Is Georgia's continued control of Abkhazia and South Ossetia really worth war with Russia? Is its continued independence from Moscow's domination, if it comes to that, worth our going to war? [...]

Regardless of which side started this conflict, and quite apart from its tangled roots (read this and this, for starters), the crisis holds a few clear lessons for the next American president.

First, security commitments are serious things; don't make them unless you have the support, desire, and means to follow through.

Second, Russia is ruled by some nasty people these days, but they are not Hitler or Stalin, and they can't be expected to tolerate direct challenges from their border any more than an American president could from, say, Cuba. (This is not to draw any moral equations, only to point out basic facts.)

Third, the sad truth is that--in part because the Cold War is over, in part because skyrocketing oil prices have engorged the Russians' coffers--we have very little leverage over what the Russians do, at least in what they see as their own security sphere. And our top officials only announce this fact loud and clear when they issue ultimatums that go ignored without consequences.

In the short term, if an independent Georgia is worth saving, the Russians need some assurances--for instance, a pledge that Georgia won't be admitted into NATO or the European Union--in exchange for keeping the country and its elected government intact. (Those who consider this "appeasement" are invited to submit other ideas that don't lead either to Georgia's utter dismantlement or to a major war.)

-- And finally, this one falls in the foolish category: McCain calls the Georgia-Russia conflict the first serious conflict since WWII, apparently forgetting about Korea, Vietnam, the 1st and 2nd Gulf Wars, Afghanistan, Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina, not to mention the genocide in Rwanda and Darfur.